|Abstract||Experimental philosophy (henceforth called X-Phi) represents a departure in methodology from standard twentieth-century philosophy; instead of privileging intuitions of professional philosophers to analyze philosophical concepts such as moral responsibility, knowledge, or intentional action, X-Phi catalogs and analyzes the intuitions of ordinary folk1 about scenarios designed to uncover the content of those concepts as found in standard usage. It formulates explanations of those intuitions that may reveal more complex and nuanced accounts of those same philosophical concepts. X-philosophers work to understand the individual psychological processes that lead to ordinary intuitions and develop theories about how ..|
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