How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?

Philosophical Studies 165 (1):221-227 (2013)
Timothy Williamson argues against the tactic of criticizing confidence in a theory by identifying a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. He dubs it “the consequence fallacy”. In this paper, we will show that Williamson’s formulation of the tactic in question is ambiguous. On one reading of Williamson’s formulation, the tactic is indeed a fallacy, but it is not a commonly used tactic; on another reading, it is a commonly used tactic (or at least more often used than the former tactic), but it is not a fallacy.
Keywords Fallacy  Logical consequence  Material conditional  Confidence  Probability  Evidence  Justification  Skepticism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9947-y
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Anthony Brueckner (1994). The Structure of the Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):827-835.

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