Singular Propositions and the A Priori

Abstract
In Frege’s Puzzle, Nathan Salmon argues that his theory of singular propositions enables him to refute Saul Kripke’s claim that some identity statements are necessary and yet a posteriori. In this paper, through a critical examination of Salmon’s rejoinders to my earlier objections to his argument, I show what implications the theory of singular propositions has for the notion of apriority. I argue that Salmon’s handling of the ‘trivialization problem,’ which presents serious difficulties for his ‘absolute’ account of apriority, leaves a great deal to be desired. I suggest, in conclusion, that the theorist of singular propositions should hold a relative view of apriority
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