Are Singular Causal Explanations Implicit Covering-Law Explanations?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):253 - 279 (1986)
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Abstract

My focus in this essay is on those singular causal explanations which purport to explain the occurrence of some particular event by means of a claim of the following general sort The occurrence of event caused the occurrence of event.Examples include sentences like The short circuit caused the fire’ and The impact of the hammer caused the shattering of the glass,’ Many philosophers hold that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between singular causal explanations and those sentences which simply report causal connections. While singular causal sentences are said to typically relate events, and to be extensional, singular causal explanations are held to relate items which are sentential or fact-like in structure and to be non-extensional.1 Singular causal explanations are held on this view to always be explanations of why events or other objects belong to certain kinds or possess certain properties.

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Author's Profile

James Woodward
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Understanding Interests and Causal Explanation.Petri Ylikoski - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
How to be realistic about folk psychology.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.
The third dogma revisited.Petri Ylikoski - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (4):395–419.
Teleological explanation: A species of causal explanation.D. Lynn Holt - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):313-325.
Review. [REVIEW]James Woodward - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):353-374.

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References found in this work

Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press.
Causal relations.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.
Aspects of Scientific Explanation.Asa Kasher - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):747-749.
Scientific explanation.James Woodward - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (1):41-67.
Davidson on explanation.Thomas Nickles - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (February):141-145.

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