David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
Manipulablity theories of causation, according to which causes are to be regarded as handles or devices for manipulating effects, have considerable intuitive appeal and are popular among social scientists and statisticians. This article surveys several prominent versions of such theories advocated by philosophers, and the many difficulties they face. Philosophical statements of the manipulationist approach are generally reductionist in aspiration and assign a central role to human action. These contrast with recent discussions employing a broadly manipulationist framework for understanding causation, such as those due to the computer scientist Judea Pearl and others, which are non-reductionist and rely instead on the notion of an intervention. This is simply an appropriately exogenous causal process; it has no essential connection with human action. This interventionist framework manages to avoid at least some of these difficulties faced by traditional philosophical versions of the manipulability theory and helps to clarify the content of causal claims
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Panu Raatikainen (2010). Causation, Exclusion, and the Special Sciences. Erkenntnis 73 (3):349-363.
Kevin McCain (2012). The Interventionist Account of Causation and the Basing Relation. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):357-382.
Olimpia Lombardi, Federico Holik & Leonardo Vanni (forthcoming). What is Shannon Information? Synthese:1-30.
Stefan Dragulinescu (2010). Diseases as Natural Kinds. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (5):347-369.
Jens Harbecke (2014). Counterfactual Causation and Mental Causation. Philosophia 42 (2):363-385.
Similar books and articles
Peter Menzies & Huw Price (1993). Causation as a Secondary Quality. BJPS 44 (2):187-203.
James Woodward (2011). Psychological Studies of Causal and Counterfactual Reasoning. In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press 16.
James Woodward (2008). Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press
Daniel Hausman & James Woodward (2004). Manipulation and the Causal Markov Condition. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):846-856.
Daniel M. Hausman & James Woodward (2004). Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition: A Restatement. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):147-161.
Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interdefining Causation and Intervention. Dialectica 63 (2):175-194.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2010). Causation. In Roberto Poli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Theory and Applications of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives. Springer Verlag 83--104.
Daniel M. Hausman (1997). Causation, Agency, and Independence. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):25.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads162 ( #13,173 of 1,727,288 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #79,857 of 1,727,288 )
How can I increase my downloads?