David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biology and Philosophy 25 (3):287-318 (2010)
This paper attempts to elucidate three characteristics of causal relationships that are important in biological contexts. Stability has to do with whether a causal relationship continues to hold under changes in background conditions. Proportionality has to do with whether changes in the state of the cause “line up” in the right way with changes in the state of the effect and with whether the cause and effect are characterized in a way that contains irrelevant detail. Specificity is connected both to David Lewis’ notion of “influence” and also with the extent to which a causal relation approximates to the ideal of one cause–one effect. Interrelations among these notions and their possible biological significance are also discussed.
|Keywords||Philosophy Evolutionary Biology Philosophy of Biology|
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References found in this work BETA
James Woodward (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Stephen Yablo (1992). Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
David Lewis (2000). Causation as Influence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Sandra D. Mitchell (2009). Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity, and Policy. The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London.
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Citations of this work BETA
Ulrich E. Stegmann (2016). ‘Genetic Coding’ Reconsidered: An Analysis of Actual Usage. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):707-730.
Christopher J. Austin (forthcoming). Aristotelian Essentialism: Essence in the Age of Evolution. Synthese:1-18.
L. R. Franklin-Hall (2014). High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist's 'Variables Problem'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):axu040.
Collin Rice (2015). Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and Scientific Explanation. Noûs 49 (3):589-615.
Charles Rathkopf (2013). Localization and Intrinsic Function. Philosophy of Science 80 (1):1-21.
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