Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 67 (3):179 (2000)
|Abstract||This paper explores how data serve as evidence for phenomena. In contrast to standard philosophical models which invite us to think of evidential relationships as logical relationships, I argue that evidential relationships in the context of data-to-phenomena reasoning are empirical relationships that depend on holding the right sort of pattern of counterfactual dependence between the data and the conclusions investigators reach on the phenomena themselves|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michela Massimi (2007). Saving Unobservable Phenomena. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):235 - 262.
Bruce Glymour (2000). Data and Phenomena: A Distinction Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 52 (1):29-37.
Benedikt Löwe & Thomas Müller (2011). Data and Phenomena in Conceptual Modelling. Synthese 182 (1):131-148.
Sabina Leonelli (2009). On the Locality of Data and Claims About Phenomena. Philosophy of Science 76 (5).
James W. McAllister (1997). Phenomena and Patterns in Data Sets. Erkenntnis 47 (2):217-228.
Eran Tal (2011). From Data to Phenomena and Back Again: Computer-Simulated Signatures. Synthese 182 (1):117-129.
Michela Massimi (2011). From Data to Phenomena: A Kantian Stance. Synthese 182 (1):101-116.
Samuel Schindler (2011). Bogen and Woodward's Data-Phenomena Distinction, Forms of Theory-Ladenness, and the Reliability of Data. Synthese 182 (1):39-55.
Uljana Feest (2011). What Exactly is Stabilized When Phenomena Are Stabilized? Synthese 182 (1):57-71.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads31 ( #44,840 of 739,324 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,029 of 739,324 )
How can I increase my downloads?