Is modal fictionalism artificial?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):535-550 (2011)
Abstract
This article examines a popular complaint against the fictionalist account of possible objects bruited by Gideon Rosen. This is the complaint that modal fictionalism is, in some sense or other, hopelessly artificial. I shall separate two different strands to this worry and examine each in turn. As we shall see, neither strand to the objection is intractable
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References found in this work BETA
Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.

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