Kantian Ethics

Cambridge University Press (2008)
In this book, Allen Wood investigates Kant's conception of ethical theory, using it to develop a viable approach to the rights and moral duties of human beings. By remaining closer to Kant's own view of the aims of ethics, Wood's understanding of Kantian ethics differs from the received "constructivist" interpretation, especially on such matters as the ground and function of ethical principles, the nature of ethical reasoning and autonomy as the ground of ethics.
Keywords Ethics, Modern
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Call number B2799.E8.W58 2008
ISBN(s) 0521671140   9780521854948   0521854946   1139465880   9781139465885
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Ido Geiger (2010). What is the Use of the Universal Law Formula of the Categorical Imperative? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (2):271 – 295.
Christopher Gregory Weaver (2015). Evilism, Moral Rationalism, and Reasons Internalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):3-24.

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