Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature

Kant's moral philosophy is grounded on the dignity of humanity as its sole fundamental value, and involves the claim that human beings are to be regarded as the ultimate end of nature. It might be thought that a theory of this kind would be incapable of grounding any conception of our relation to other living things or to the natural world which would value nonhuman creatures or respect humanity's natural environment. This paper criticizes Kant's argumentative strategy for dealing with our duties in regard to animals, but defends both his theory and most of his conclusions on these topics.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8349.00042
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Amy Mullin (2011). Children and the Argument From 'Marginal' Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):291-305.

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