Graduate studies at Western
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):261-277 (2011)
|Abstract||This paper examines the idea of an extended unit of action, which is the idea that the reasons for or against an individual action can depend on the qualities of a larger pattern of action of which it is a part. One concept of joint action is that the unit of action can be extended in this sense. But the idea of an extended unit of action is surprisingly minimal in its commitments. The paper argues for this conclusion by examining uses of the idea of an extended unit of action in four theoretical contexts. It also explains why the idea of an extended unit of action need not involve magical thinking, and discusses possible replies to an objection based on a worry about recklessness|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Doug Mann (1999). The Limits of Instrumental Rationality in Social Explanation. Critical Review 13 (1-2):165-189.
Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Natalie Sebanz (2011). Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared? [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):137-146.
Olle Blomberg (2011). Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
Duncan Macintosh (2007). Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action - By G.F. Schueler. Philosophical Books 48 (1):86-88.
Michael Schmid (1988). The Idea of Rationality and its Relationship to Social Science: Comments on Popper's Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Inquiry 31 (4):451 – 469.
David-Hillel Ruben (2010). The Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action. In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford.
Mark Rowlands (2006). The Normativity of Action. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):401-416.
Christopher Woodard (2003). Group-Based Reasons for Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):215-229.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #62,705 of 739,304 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,304 )
How can I increase my downloads?