David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 25 (December):435-50 (1982)
The anti?Cartesian idea that a person's thoughts are not entirely fixed by what goes on inside that person's head is suggested by Hegel, and echoed in Wittgenstein and Frege. An argument for the view has recently been given by Tyler Burge. This paper claims that Burge's data can be explained better by an individualistic theory. The basic idea is that an individual's thoughts are specified analogically, in ordinary discourse, through the model of a language. Though the modelling?sentences are public, the thoughts of the individual are inner states whose identity does not depend upon those sentences. They have content naturally, whether or not content happens to be ascribed to them
|Keywords||Epistemology Language Sentence Thought Burge, T|
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Crawford Elder (1980). Appropriating Hegel. Aberdeen University Press.
J. A. Fodor (1980). Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63.
Gottlob Frege (1956). The Thought: A Logical Inquiry. Mind 65 (259):289-311.
Hilary Putnam (1975). Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Pierre Jacob (1987). Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions. Mind and Language 2 (4):301-325.
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