David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Indeed, these are the sorts of reasons that Act Consequentialism recognises. But we can think of act-based reasons as a limiting kind of pattern-based reason, in which the pattern P is identical to the action A. Thus the idea of pattern-based reasons is more general than the idea of act-based reasons, and we can properly understand Act Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons. If pattern-based reasons exist, they are reasons for individual agents to act. They are not supposed to be reasons for group agents to act. It is controversial whether their existence depends on the existence of group agents.3 But even if it does, they are supposed to be reasons for individuals to act. It is very important not to think of them as reasons for groups to act. To help keep track of the individual agent whose reasons we are interested in, I will call her ‘the actor’.
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