The things that aren't actually there

Philosophical Studies 152 (2):155 - 166 (2011)
The standard Kripkean semantic theories for quantified modal logic allow the individuals that exist at other worlds to vary from those that exist at the actual world. This causes a problem for those who deny the existence of non-actual individuals. I focus on two prominent strategies for solving this problem, due respectively to Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta (who identify the possible individuals with the actual individuals) and Alvin Plantinga (who identifies the possible individuals with the individual essences). I argue, contra various commentators, that both of these solutions are acceptable by the lights of those who deny the existence of mere possibilia
Keywords Actualism  Modality  Possible worlds  Possibilia  Plantinga  Kripke semantics
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References found in this work BETA
Karen Bennett (2006). Proxy “Actualism”. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):263 - 294.
Eli Hirsch (2004). Comments on Theodore Sider's Four Dimensionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):658–664.
Thomas Jager (1982). An Actualistic Semantics for Quantified Modal Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (3):335-349.

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