Understanding Regression

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:255 - 269 (1988)
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Abstract

This paper explores, in a rather schematic way, some issues having to do with the conception of causation and explanation implicit in regression analysis. I argue that (a) regression analysis does not yield lawlike generalizations but rather claims about causal connections in particular populations and that (b) regression analyses are not plausibly viewed as part of a neo-Humean program of analyzing causal claims in terms of claims about patterns of statistical association. I also argue that (c) the conception of explanation implicit in regression analysis is deductive and involves the exhibition of a pattern of counterfactual dependence between mean values of the independent and dependent variables.

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Citations of this work

Not a sure thing: Fitness, probability, and causation.Denis M. Walsh - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):147-171.
Realism about laws.James Woodward - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (2):181-218.
Can causes be reduced to correlations?Gürol Irzik - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2):249-270.

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