David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55 (1997)
In this paper, I argue that we should not ascribe beliefs and desires to subjects like zombies or (present day) computers which do not have phenomenal consciousness. In order to ascribe beliefs, we must distinguish between personal and subpersonal content. There may be states in my brain which represent the array of light intensities on my retina, but these states are not beliefs, because they are merely subpersonal. I argue that we cannot distinguish between personal and subpersonal content without reference to phenomenal consciousness. I argue for this by examining two attempts to account for belief without reference to phenomenal consciousness, functionalism and Dennett's patterns of behavior theory, and showing that they both fail. In the course of the arguments that these attempts fail, I develop some positive reasons for believing that phenomenal consciousness is indeed necessary
|Keywords||Behavior Belief Consciousness Science Dennett, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Charles Siewert (1993). What Dennett Can't Imagine and Why. Inquiry 36 (1-2):93-112.
David J. Chalmers (2003). The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 220--72.
Nicholas Georgalis (2003). The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
David Hunter (2008). Belief and Self-Consciousness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):673 – 693.
Bryce Huebner (2010). Commonsense Concepts of Phenomenal Consciousness: Does Anyone Care About Functional Zombies? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):133-155.
Susan Schneider (2007). Daniel Dennett on the Nature of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 313--24.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1).
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):103-104.
Matthew Elton (2000). Consciousness: Only at the Personal Level. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):25-42.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads33 ( #53,571 of 1,102,738 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #84,424 of 1,102,738 )
How can I increase my downloads?