David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 46 (3):281-304 (1997)
Yablo suggests that we can understand the possibility of mental causation by supposing that mental properties determine physical properties, in the classic sense of determination according to which red determines scarlet. Determinates and their determinables do not compete for causal relevance, so if mental and physical properties are related as determinable and determinates, they should not compete for causal relevance either. I argue that this solution won''t work. I first construct a more adequate account of determination than that provided by Yablo. I then consider two common accounts of the mental, token identity theories and dispositional theories, and argue that on neither do mental and physical properties satisfy the requirements for determination
|Keywords||Causation Determination Mental Metaphysics Supervenience Yablo, S|
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William Jaworski (2009). The Logic of How-Questions. Synthese 166 (1):133 - 155.
Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Nonexistence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483–504.
Ann Whittle (2007). The Co-Instantiation Thesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):61 – 79.
Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Non-Existence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483-504.
Jens Harbecke (2013). The Role of Supervenience and Constitution in Neuroscientific Research. Synthese:1-19.
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