David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):356-362 (2010)
Obviously medicine should be evidence-based. The issues lie in the details: what exactly counts as evidence? Do certain kinds of evidence carry more weight than others? (And if so why?) And how exactly should medicine be based on evidence? When it comes to these details, the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement has got itself into a mess – or so it will be argued. In order to start to resolve this mess, we need to go 'back to basics'; and that means turning to the philosophy of science. The theory of evidence, or rather the logic of the interrelations between theory and evidence, has always been central to the philosophy of science – sometimes under the alias of the 'theory of confirmation'. When taken together with a little philosophical commonsense, this logic can help us move towards a position on evidence in medicine that is more sophisticated and defensible than anything that EBM has been able so far to supply.
|Keywords||controlled trial philosophy of science severe test evidence‐based medicine external validity logic of evidence|
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Citations of this work BETA
Alexander Mebius (2014). Corroborating Evidence-Based Medicine. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 20 (6):915-920.
Brendan Clarke, Donald Gillies, Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2014). Mechanisms and the Evidence Hierarchy. Topoi 33 (2):339-360.
Jeremy Howick (2011). Exposing the Vanities—and a Qualified Defense—of Mechanistic Reasoning in Health Care Decision Making. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):926-940.
Michael Loughlin, Ross E. G. Upshur, Maya J. Goldenberg, Robyn Bluhm & Kirstin Borgerson (2010). Philosophy, Ethics, Medicine and Health Care: The Urgent Need for Critical Practice. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):249-259.
Michael Loughlin, Robyn Bluhm, Drozdstoj S. Stoyanov, Stephen Buetow, Ross E. G. Upshur, Kirstin Borgerson, Maya J. Goldenberg & Elselijn Kingma (2013). Explanation, Understanding, Objectivity and Experience. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (3):415-421.
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