David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):305 – 319 (1990)
Abstract This paper attempts to clarify the debate between those philosophers who hold that the development of science is governed by objective standards of rationality and those sociologists of science who deny this. In particular it focuses on the debate over the ?symmetry thesis?. Bloor and Barnes argue that a properly scientific approach to science itself demands that an investigator should seek the same general type of explanation for all decisions and actions by past scientists, quite independently of whether or not she or he happens to agree with those decisions or approve those actions as ?correct? or ?rational?. I try to improve on previous treatments of the ?rationalist? position (by Lakatos, Laudan, Newton?Smith and Brown) and clarify the exact asymmetries to which the ?rationalist? is, and is not, committed
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References found in this work BETA
L. Laudan (1977). Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. University of California Press.
David Bloor (1991). Knowledge and Social Imagery. University of Chicago Press.
Larry Laudan (1984). Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate. University of California Press.
John Worrall (1989). Fix It and Be Damned: A Reply to Laudan. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):376-388.
John Worrall (1988). The Value of a Fixed Methodology. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):263-275.
Citations of this work BETA
Nicholas Shackel (2005). The Vacuity of Postmodernist Methodology. Metaphilosophy 36 (3):295-320.
Adrian Haddock (2004). Rethinking the “Strong Programme” in the Sociology of Knowledge. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):19-40.
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