Existential phenomenology and cognitive science
Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy (4) (1996)
| Abstract | [1] In _What Computers Can't Do_ (1972), Hubert Dreyfus identified several basic assumptions about the nature of human knowledge which grounded contemporary research in cognitive science. Contemporary artificial intelligence, he argued, relied on an unjustified belief that the mind functions like a digital computer using symbolic manipulations ("the psychological assumption") (Dreyfus 1992: 163ff), or at least that computer programs could be understood as formalizing human thought ("the epistemological assumption") (Dreyfus 1992: 189). In addition, the project depended upon an assumption about the data about the human world which we employ in thought - namely, that it consists of discrete, determinate, and explicit pieces which can be processed heuristically ("the ontological assumption") (Dreyfus 1992: 206) | |||||||||
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Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus (1991). Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise. Human Studies 14 (4):229 - 250.
Philip Brey (2001). Hubert Dreyfus: Humans Versus Computers. In American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Ron McClamrock (1995). Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World. University of Chicago Press.
Jethro Masís (2011). El Mito de Lo Mental: El Proyecto de Investigación de la Inteligencia Artificial y la Transformación Hermenéutica de la Fenomenología (Primera Parte). Eikasís. Revista de Filosofía (41).
Evan Selinger (2008). Collins's Incorrect Depiction of Dreyfus's Critique of Artificial Intelligence. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2).
Andler (2000). Context and Background. Dreyfus and Cognitive Science. In W. Wrathall (ed.), Heidegger, Coping and Cognitive Science, Cambridge.
Andrew Brook (2008). Phenomenology: Contribution to Cognitive Science. Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE II, Pp. 54 – 70, 2008:54-70.
Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1975). Minds, Machines and Phenomenology: Some Reflections on Dreyfus' What Computers Can't Do. Cognition 3:57-77.
Setargew Kenaw (2008). Hubert L. Dreyfus's Critique of Classical AI and its Rationalist Assumptions. Minds and Machines 18 (2).
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