Kuhn's constructionism

Perspectives on Science 18 (3):311-327 (2010)
I challenge Hacking's characterization of Kuhn's constructionism. I argue that Kuhn does not believe that nature has no joints. Rather, Kuhn believes there is no unique correct way to cut nature into kinds. I also argue that Kuhn is not an externalist. He believes that disputes in science are resolved on the basis of a consideration of the epistemic merits of the theories. Subjective factors merely ensure that competing theories are developed, and the strengths and weaknesses of the theories are exposed. Epistemic considerations are what ultimately lead to consensus in a research community
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DOI 10.1162/POSC_a_00014
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References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1950). Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (2):20--40.
Alexander Bird (2003). Kuhn, Nominalism, and Empiricism. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):690-719.
K. Brad Wray (2005). Does Science Have a Moving Target? American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):47-58.

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