Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 190 (9):1719-1729 (2013)
|Abstract||I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, comparing a test of success of our theories to medical tests with low rates of false positives and false negatives. But, contrary to what Lewis claims, I argue that it is not enough for the realist to undercut the claim that success is not a reliable indicator of truth. Rather, the realist must show that our current best theories are likely true. Further, I argue that tests in science are unlike medical tests in a number of important ways|
|Keywords||Pessimistic induction Success Truth Realism Anti-realism Medical tests Prediction|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gerald Doppelt (2007). Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):96-118.
Gerald Doppelt (2013). Explaining the Success of Science: Kuhn and Scientific Realists. Topoi 32 (1):43-51.
Gerald D. Doppelt (2011). From Standard Scientific Realism and Structural Realism to Best Current Theory Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):295-316.
Ioannis Votsis (2011). The Prospective Stance in Realism. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1223-1234.
David B. Resnik (1992). Convergent Realism and Approximate Truth. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:421 - 434.
Gerald Doppelt (2005). Empirical Success or Explanatory Success: What Does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain? Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1076-1087.
Ludwig Fahrbach (2011). Theory Change and Degrees of Success. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1283-1292.
Jamin Asay (2011). Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Andre Kukla (1996). Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):305.
K. Brad Wray (2010). Selection and Predictive Success. Erkenntnis 72 (3):365 - 377.
Valeriano Iranzo (2008). Reliabilism and the Abductive Defence of Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 39 (1):115 - 120.
Gerald Doppelt, Does Structural Realism Provide the Best Explanation of the Predictive Success of Science?
D. Harker (2013). How to Split a Theory: Defending Selective Realism and Convergence Without Proximity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):79-106.
Added to index2011-09-23
Total downloads97 ( #8,350 of 731,463 )
Recent downloads (6 months)41 ( #2,158 of 731,463 )
How can I increase my downloads?