Inter-world probability and the problem of induction

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):387–402 (2006)
Abstract
Laurence BonJour has recently proposed a novel and interesting approach to the problem of induction. He grants that it is contingent, and so not a priori, that our patterns of inductive inference are reliable. Nevertheless, he claims, it is necessary and a priori that those patterns are highly likely to be reliable, and that is enough to ground an a priori justification induction. This paper examines an important defect in BonJour's proposal. Once we make sense of the claim that inductive inference is "necessarily highly likely" to be reliable, we find that it is not knowable a priori after all.
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    Citations of this work BETA
    James Beebe (2009). The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605 - 636.
    Jonathan Vogel (2010). BonJour on Explanation and Skepticism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):413-421.
    James R. Beebe (2009). The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605-636.
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