David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 181 (3):451-470 (2011)
Philip Kitcher has argued for a causal correspondence view of truth, as against a deflationary view, on the grounds that the former is better poised than the latter to explain systematically successful patterns of action. Though Kitcher is right to focus on systematically successful action, rather than singular practical successes, he is wrong to conclude that causal correspondence theories are capable of explaining systematic success. Rather, I argue, truth bears no explanatory relation to systematic practical success. Consequently, the causal correspondence view is not in a better position to explain success than the deflationary view; theories of truth are the wrong place to look for explanations of systematic practical success.
|Keywords||Kitcher Truth Deflationism Correspondence Success Action|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Paul Horwich (1998). Truth. Clarendon Press.
Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.
Rick Grush (2004). The Emulation Theory of Representation: Motor Control, Imagery, and Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):377-396.
David Lewis (1979). Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow. Noûs 13 (4):455-476.
Karen Bennett (2003). Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It. Noûs 37 (3):471-97.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
K. Brad Wray (2010). Selection and Predictive Success. Erkenntnis 72 (3):365 - 377.
By Nic Damnjanovic (2005). Deflationism and the Success Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):53–67.
Jerry Kapus (2007). Truth, Deflationism, and Success. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:85-91.
P. Kyle Stanford (2000). An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science. Philosophy of Science 67 (2):266-284.
Alison Hills (2007). Practical Reason, Value and Action. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):375-392.
Gerald Doppelt (2007). Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):96-118.
Chase B. Wrenn (2010). True Belief is Not Instrumentally Valuable. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan
Gerald D. Doppelt (2011). From Standard Scientific Realism and Structural Realism to Best Current Theory Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):295-316.
P. D. Magnus (2003). Success, Truth and the Galilean Strategy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):465-474.
Added to index2010-03-13
Total downloads70 ( #65,402 of 2,117,590 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #55,577 of 2,117,590 )
How can I increase my downloads?