Practical success and the nature of truth

Synthese 181 (3):451-470 (2011)
Philip Kitcher has argued for a causal correspondence view of truth, as against a deflationary view, on the grounds that the former is better poised than the latter to explain systematically successful patterns of action. Though Kitcher is right to focus on systematically successful action, rather than singular practical successes, he is wrong to conclude that causal correspondence theories are capable of explaining systematic success. Rather, I argue, truth bears no explanatory relation to systematic practical success. Consequently, the causal correspondence view is not in a better position to explain success than the deflationary view; theories of truth are the wrong place to look for explanations of systematic practical success.
Keywords Kitcher  Truth  Deflationism  Correspondence  Success  Action
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9733-3
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Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.

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