David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Contemporary Pragmatism 2 (1):95-113 (2005)
C. S. Peirce once defined pragmatism as the opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: ‘Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’ (Peirce 1982a: 48) More succinctly, Richard Rorty has described the position in this way.
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Giorgio Volpe (2015). Truth and Justification: A Difference That Makes a Difference. Philosophia 43 (1):217-232.
Chase Wrenn (2010). A Puzzle About Desire. Erkenntnis 73 (2):185-209.
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