Truth and other self-effacing properties

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):577–586 (2004)
Abstract
A “self-effacing” property is one that is definable without referring to it. Colin McGinn (2000) has argued that there is exactly one such property: truth. I show that if truth is a self-effacing property, then there are very many others—too many even to constitute a set.
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References found in this work BETA
W. D. Hart & Colin McGinn (1978). On Propositions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19 (2):299-306.
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