The Unreality of Realization

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):305-322 (2010)
This paper argues against the _realization principle_, which reifies the realization relation between lower-level and higher-level properties. It begins with a review of some principles of naturalistic metaphysics. Then it criticizes some likely reasons for embracing the realization principle, and finally it argues against the principle directly. The most likely reasons for embracing the principle depend on the dubious assumption that special science theories cannot be true unless special science predicates designate properties. The principle itself turns out to be false because the realization relation fails the naturalistic test for reality: it makes no causal difference to the world.1
Keywords realization  causation  properties  functionalism  naturalism  physicalism
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DOI 10.1080/00048400902943790
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Real Patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.

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Citations of this work BETA
Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). Intralevel Mental Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.

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