Why There are No Epistemic Duties

Abstract
An epistemic duty would be a duty to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment from a proposition, and it would be grounded in purely evidential or epistemic considerations. If I promise to believe it is raining, my duty to believe is not epistemic. If my evidence is so good that, in light of it alone, I ought to believe it is raining, then my duty to believe supposedly is epistemic. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people do sometimes have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations.
Keywords rationality  epistemology  epistemic duty  deontology  epistemic normativity  evidentialism
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1991). Firth and the Ethics of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):119-128.

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