David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):125-42 (2003)
Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter (1987)2 have argued for a version of reductive physicalism about color which they claim can accommodate the basic intuitions that have led others to embrace dispositionalism or subjectivism about color. Jackson (1996) has further developed the view and provided responses to some objections to its original statement. While Jackson and Pargetter do not have much company in endorsing their specific form of color physicalism, elements of their view have shown up in other realist accounts, including the relativized account of color offered by John Spackman (2002), the disjunctivism of color properties endorsed by Peter Ross (2000), and the subjectivist strain present in Sydney Shoemaker’s (1994) discussion of color.3 Additionally, Mark Johnston (1992) has used Jackson and Pargetter’s view as a principal target in his arguments against color physicalism.
|Keywords||Color Metaphysics Physicalism Jackson, F Pargetter, R|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Phenomenal Character. Noûs 28 (1):21-38.
David R. Hilbert (1992). What is Color Vision? Philosophical Studies 68 (3):351-70.
Frank Jackson (1996). The Primary Quality View of Color. Philosophical Perspectives 10:199-219.
J. J. C. Smart (1975). On Some Criticisms of a Physicalist Theory of Colors. In Charles L. Y. Cheng (ed.), Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. University Press of Hawaii
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Philip Pettit (2004). Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press 105--142.
Jonathan Cohen (2001). Subjectivism, Physicalism or None of the Above? Comments on Ross's The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):94-104.
Dale Jacquette (1995). The Blue Banana Trick: Dennett on Jackson's Color Scientist. Theoria 61 (3):217-30.
Frank Jackson (2000). Philosophizing About Color. In Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press
Joseph Levine (2006). Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing. Dialectica 60 (3):269-282.
Wayne Wright (2010). Perception, Color, and Realism. Erkenntnis 73 (1):19 - 40.
Nenad Miščević (2011). No More Tears in Heaven: Two Views of Response-Dependence. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 26 (1):75-93.
P. Ross (2000). The Relativity of Color. Synthese 123 (1):105-130.
Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1987). An Objectivist's Guide to Subjectivism About Color. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 41 (1):127-141.
Peter W. Ross (2012). Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: A Problem for Color Subjectivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #105,336 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #183,615 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?