A dilemma for Jackson and Pargetter's account of color

Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):125-42 (2003)
Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter (1987)2 have argued for a version of reductive physicalism about color which they claim can accommodate the basic intuitions that have led others to embrace dispositionalism or subjectivism about color. Jackson (1996) has further developed the view and provided responses to some objections to its original statement. While Jackson and Pargetter do not have much company in endorsing their specific form of color physicalism, elements of their view have shown up in other realist accounts, including the relativized account of color offered by John Spackman (2002), the disjunctivism of color properties endorsed by Peter Ross (2000), and the subjectivist strain present in Sydney Shoemaker’s (1994) discussion of color.3 Additionally, Mark Johnston (1992) has used Jackson and Pargetter’s view as a principal target in his arguments against color physicalism.
Keywords Color  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Jackson, F  Pargetter, R
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2003.tb00945.x
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References found in this work BETA
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
David R. Hilbert (1992). What is Color Vision? Philosophical Studies 68 (3):351-70.
Frank Jackson (1996). The Primary Quality View of Color. Philosophical Perspectives 10:199-219.

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