David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301-330 (2007)
This paper argues that the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness is scientifically irrelevant, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the 'sense of understanding' that plays a critical role in the form of explanation implicated in the hard problem provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on satisfactory scientific explanation. Considerations of the actual tools and methods available to scientists are used to make the case against it being a necessary condition, and work by J.D. Trout that exploits psychological research on the hindsight and overconfidence biases is used to show that it is not a sufficient condition. It is argued, however, that certain intellectual and moral concerns give us good reason to still try to meet the hard problem's explanatory challenge, despite its extrascientific nature
|Keywords||REDUCTIVE EXPLANATION QUALIA MATTER BIAS GAP|
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
James Woodward (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Peter K. Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver (2000). Thinking About Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Citations of this work BETA
J. D. Trout (2007). The Psychology of Scientific Explanation. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):564–591.
Thomas W. Polger (2008). H2O, 'Water', and Transparent Reduction. Erkenntnis 69 (1):109-130.
Wayne Wright (2007). Why Naturalize Consciousness? Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):583-607.
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