David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ratio 23 (2):217-231 (2010)
Many authors hold that collectives, as well as individuals can be the subjects of <span class='Hi'>obligations</span>. Typically these authors have focussed on the <span class='Hi'>obligations</span> of highly structured groups, and (less often) of small, informal groups. One might wonder, however, whether there could also be collective <span class='Hi'>obligations</span> which fall on everyone – what I shall call '<span class='Hi'>global</span> collective <span class='Hi'>obligations</span>'. One reason for thinking that this is not possible has to do with considerations about <span class='Hi'>agency</span>: it seems as though an entity can only be the subject of <span class='Hi'>obligations</span> if it is an agent. In this paper, I try to show that the argument from <span class='Hi'>agency</span> is not a good reason for being sceptical about the existence of <span class='Hi'>global</span> collective <span class='Hi'>obligations</span>: it derives whatever plausibility it has from the idea that claims about obligation need to be addressable to some agent. My suggestion is that we should accept this principle about the addressability of <span class='Hi'>obligations</span>, but deny that the addressee of an obligation need be the subject of that obligation. The collective <span class='Hi'>obligations</span> of unstructured collections of individuals, including <span class='Hi'>global</span> collective <span class='Hi'>obligations</span>, meet the addressability requirement insofar as they require something of the individuals who make up the collective.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Anne Schwenkenbecher (2013). Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations. Ratio 26 (3):310-328.
Bill Wringe (2014). Collective Obligations: Their Existence, Their Explanatory Power, and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4).
Anne Schwenkenbecher (2014). Joint Moral Duties. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):58-74.
Similar books and articles
M. L. J. Wissenburg (2011). Parenting and Intergenerational Justice: Why Collective Obligations Towards Future Generations Take Second Place to Individual Responsibility. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 24 (6):557-573.
Nicole Hassoun (2012). Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations. Cambridge University Press.
Margaret P. Gilbert (2009). Obligation and Joint Commitment. Utilitas 11 (02):143-.
Margaret Gilbert (1993). Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation. Ethics 103 (4):679-706.
Sadeq Larijani (2007). Rational and Moral Obligations. Topoi 26 (2):231-245.
Holly Lawford-Smith (2012). The Feasibility of Collectives' Actions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):453-467.
Anne Schwenkenbecher (2011). Moral Obligations of States. In Applied Ethics Series. Center of Applied Ethics and Philosophy
Nellie Wieland (2011). Parental Obligation. Utilitas 23 (03):249-267.
Leslie Pickering Francis (2003). Global Systemic Problems and Interconnected Duties. Environmental Ethics 25 (2):115-128.
Joshua Kassner (2009). Completing the Incomplete: A Defense of Positive Obligations to Distant Others. Journal of Global Ethics 5 (3):181 – 193.
Added to index2010-04-20
Total downloads33 ( #96,361 of 1,724,937 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #110,393 of 1,724,937 )
How can I increase my downloads?