Is pluralism about truth inherently unstable?

Philosophical Studies 159 (1):89-105 (2012)
Abstract
Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable---or, worse, just a non-starter---it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all.
Keywords truth  pluralism  monism  correspondence  property  scope problem  instability  inflationism  reductive analysis  disjunctivism
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References found in this work BETA
H. B. Acton (1934). The Correspondence Theory of Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 35:177 - 194.
Donald Davidson (1973). On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5--20.
Julian Dodd (2002). Recent Work on Truth. Philosophical Books 43 (4):279-291.
Dale Dorsey (2006). A Coherence Theory of Truth in Ethics. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):493 - 523.
Dale Dorsey (2010). Truth and Error in Morality. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan. 235--248.

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