Is pluralism about truth inherently unstable?

Philosophical Studies 159 (1):89-105 (2012)
Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable---or, worse, just a non-starter---it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all.
Keywords truth  pluralism  monism  correspondence  property  scope problem  instability  inflationism  reductive analysis  disjunctivism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9691-0
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1973). On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5--20.
Michael P. Lynch (2004). Truth and Multiple Realizability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.

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Citations of this work BETA
Aaron J. Cotnoir (2013). Validity for Strong Pluralists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):563-579.

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Douglas Edwards (2011). Simplifying Alethic Pluralism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
Michael P. Lynch (2004). Truth and Multiple Realizability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
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Steven D. Hales (2001). Lynch's Metaphysical Pluralism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):699–709.

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