Internalist virtues and knowledge
Acta Analytica 25 (2):119-132 (2010)
| Abstract | What role can intellectual virtues play in an account of knowledge when we interpret those virtues internalistically, i.e., as depending only on internal states of the cognizer? Though it has been argued that internalist virtues are ill suited to play any role in an account of knowledge, I will show that, on the contrary, internalist virtues can play an important role in recent accounts of knowledge developed to utilize externalist virtues. The virtue account of knowledge developed by Linda Zagzebski is intended to be supplemented by her version of the intellectual virtues which require an external success component. John Greco and Wayne Riggs both develop credit accounts of knowledge on which the abilities we use when we get credit for a true belief must be reliable. I examine the similarities between these three accounts of knowledge and demonstrate that internalist virtues fit into these accounts just as well as externalist virtues. Thus, although internalist virtues do not require a reliable connection to truth, they can still play an important role in defining the truth-requiring concept of knowledge. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Elke Brendel (1999). Coherence Theory of Knowledge: A Gradational Account. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):293-307.
Robert C. Roberts (1992). Emotions Among the Virtues of the Christian Life. Journal of Religious Ethics 20 (1):37 - 68.
Jason S. Baehr (2006). Character in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):479--514.
Ronald Sandler (2005). Ignorance and Virtue. Philosophical Papers 34 (2):261-272.
W. Jay Wood & Robert Campbell Roberts (2007). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Reza Lahroodi (2007). Collective Epistemic Virtues. Social Epistemology 21 (3):281 – 297.
Robert Campbell Roberts (2007). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Sue P. Stafford (2010). Intellectual Virtues in Environmental Virtue Ethics. Environmental Ethics 32 (4):339-352.
S. Goldberg (2009). The Social Virtues: Two Accounts. Acta Analytica 24 (4):237-248.
Sarah Wright (2009). The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):91-112.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-11-07Total downloads32 ( #37,931 of 549,087 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,087 )How can I increase my downloads? |

