Internalist virtues and knowledge

Acta Analytica 25 (2):119-132 (2010)
Abstract
What role can intellectual virtues play in an account of knowledge when we interpret those virtues internalistically, i.e., as depending only on internal states of the cognizer? Though it has been argued that internalist virtues are ill suited to play any role in an account of knowledge, I will show that, on the contrary, internalist virtues can play an important role in recent accounts of knowledge developed to utilize externalist virtues. The virtue account of knowledge developed by Linda Zagzebski is intended to be supplemented by her version of the intellectual virtues which require an external success component. John Greco and Wayne Riggs both develop credit accounts of knowledge on which the abilities we use when we get credit for a true belief must be reliable. I examine the similarities between these three accounts of knowledge and demonstrate that internalist virtues fit into these accounts just as well as externalist virtues. Thus, although internalist virtues do not require a reliable connection to truth, they can still play an important role in defining the truth-requiring concept of knowledge.
Keywords Intellectual virtue  Internalism  Knowledge  Reliability  Credit
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-009-0066-0
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Jack Lyons (2013). Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.

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