Justification, Discovery, Reason & Argument

Argumentation 15 (1):97-104 (2001)
In distinguishing justification from discovery, the logical empiricists hoped to avoid confusing causal matters with normative ones. Exaggerating the virtue of this distinction, however, has disguised from us important features of the concept of a reason as it functions in human practice. Surfacing those features gives some insight into reasoning and argument
Keywords argument  competence  discovery  explanation  justification  reasons  understanding
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DOI 10.1023/A:1007800732356
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