Philosophy of Science 41 (4):345-360 (1974)
|Abstract||It is commonly thought that the dispositional view of purposiveness is itself incompatible with the programmatic claims of neurophysiologists. In this paper, various versions of four arguments for this incompatibility are examined, and rejected as unsound. Central to the argument is a rough sketch of a "mechanistic" position which seems clearly compatible with a dispositional view of purposiveness|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Derk Pereboom (1996). Kant on God, Evil, and Teleology. Faith and Philosophy 13 (4):508-533.
Petri Ylikoski (2005). The Third Dogma Revisited. Foundations of Science 10 (4):395–419.
Stuart Glennan (2010). Ephemeral Mechanisms and Historical Explanation. Erkenntnis 72 (2):251 - 266.
Johannes Persson (2005). Tropes as Mechanisms. Foundations of Science 10 (4).
Ralph S. Lillie (1915). What is Purposive and Intelligent Behavior From the Physiological Point of View? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12 (22):589-610.
Rob Vanderbeeken & Erik Weber (2002). Dispositional Explanations of Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 30:43 - 59.
William Timberlake (2004). Is the Operant Contingency Enough for a Science of Purposive Behavior? Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):197 - 229.
Karl-Dieter Opp (2005). Explanations by Mechanisms in the Social Sciences. Problems, Advantages and Alternatives. Mind and Society 4 (2):163-178.
Cory D. Wright & William P. Bechtel (2007). Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation. In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads5 ( #160,483 of 549,196 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,196 )
How can I increase my downloads?