David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Metaphilosophy 37 (1):92–111 (2006)
In the face of pluralism, moral constructivists attempt to salvage cognitivism by separating moral and ethical issues. Divergence over ethical issues, which concern the good life, would not threaten moral cognitivism, which is based on identifying generalizable interests as worthy of defending, using reason. Yet this approach falters given the inability of the constructivist to provide us a sure path by which to discern generalizable interests in difficult cases. Still, even if this approach to constructivism fails, cognitivist aspirations may not be defeated if we can continue discursively in a project of identifying and appreciating the interests of others. Grasping the interests of others may require a transformation of moral sensibility such that agents recognize values they have not acknowledged before. This view calls for external moral discourse—that is, moral discourse that makes no appeal to an agent's present interests or desires but rather engages in description of the moral situation in hopes of bringing about a change in moral sensibility.
|Keywords||Habermas moral cognitivism moral discourse relativism McDowell interests constructivism moral pluralism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Thomas Nagel (1986). The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Hallvard Lillehammer (2002). Moral Cognitivism. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):1-25.
Marion Hourdequin (2012). Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.
Douglas W. Portmore (2008). Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369 - 388.
Matthias Kiesselbach (2009). Warring Tautologies: Moral Dissent from a Cognitivist Perspective. Ethic@ 8 (1):125-145.
Eva Erman (2007). Conflict and Universal Moral Theory: From Reasonableness to Reason-Giving. Political Theory 35 (5):598 - 623.
Gunnar Björnsson (2012). Do 'Objectivist' Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism? Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
Folke Tersman (1995). Non-Cognitivism and Inconsistency. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):361-372.
Richard Joyce (2000). The Fugitive Thought. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):463-478.
Ragnar Francén (2010). Moral Motivation Pluralism. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads47 ( #72,555 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?