David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
European Journal of Philosophy of Science 2 (3):375-394 (2012)
The ontic conception of scientific explanation has been constructed and motivated on the basis of a putative lexical ambiguity in the term explanation. I raise a puzzle for this ambiguity claim, and then give a deflationary solution under which all ontically-rendered talk of explanation is merely elliptical; what it is elliptical for is a view of scientific explanation that altogether avoids the ontic conception. This result has revisionary consequences for New Mechanists and other philosophers of science, many of whom have assimilated their conception of explanation to the ontic conception.
|Keywords||Ambiguity Craver Exhibition Mechanism Mechanistic explanation Ontic conception Salmon Scientific explanation Syllepsis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Carl F. Craver (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Michael Strevens (2008). Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. Harvard University Press.
Wesley Salmon (1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton University Press.
William Bechtel (2005). Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biol and Biomed Sci 36 (2):421--441.
Stuart Glennan (2002). Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S342-353.
Citations of this work BETA
Cory Wright (2015). The Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 54:20-30.
Dingmar van Eck (forthcoming). Reconciling Ontic and Epistemic Constraints on Mechanistic Explanation, Epistemically. Axiomathes 25 (1):5-22.
Phyllis Illari (2013). Mechanistic Explanation: Integrating the Ontic and Epistemic. Erkenntnis 78 (2):237-255.
Marcin Miłkowski (forthcoming). Explanatory Completeness and Idealization in Large Brain Simulations: A Mechanistic Perspective. Synthese:1-22.
Similar books and articles
Wesley C. Salmon (1984). Scientific Explanation: Three Basic Conceptions. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:293 - 305.
Cory D. Wright & William P. Bechtel (2007). Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation. In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier
Johannes Persson (2010). Activity-Based Accounts of Mechanism and the Threat of Polygenic Effects. Erkenntnis 72 (1):135 - 149.
Viorel Pâslaru (2009). Ecological Explanation Between Manipulation and Mechanism Description. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):821-837.
Michael Bradie (1996). Ontic Realism and Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):321.
Johannes Persson (2012). Three Conceptions of Explaining How Possibly—and One Reductive Account. In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer 275--286.
Eric Barnes (1994). Explaining Brute Facts. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:61 - 68.
Paul Thompson (1988). Explanation in the Semantic Conception of Theory Structure. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:286 - 296.
Phyllis McKay Illari & Jon Williamson (2011). Mechanisms Are Real and Local. In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. OUP Oxford
Arnon Levy (2009). Explaining What? Review of Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience by Carl F. Craver. Biology and Philosophy 24 (1).
William P. Bechtel (1998). Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist Challenge in Cognitive Science. Cognitive Science 22 (3):295-317.
Daniel J. Nicholson (2012). The Concept of Mechanism in Biology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (1):152-163.
Joseph F. Hanna (1982). Probabilistic Explanation and Probabilistic Causality. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:181 - 193.
Added to index2012-02-16
Total downloads177 ( #8,165 of 1,724,747 )
Recent downloads (6 months)29 ( #35,104 of 1,724,747 )
How can I increase my downloads?