McKinsey one more time

In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press (2008)
Abstract
§1 It is not always true that recognizably valid reasoning from known, or otherwise epistemically warranted premises, can be enlisted to produce knowledge, or other epistemic warrant, for a conclusion. The counterexamples are cases that exhibit what I have elsewhere called warrant transmission-failure. It is nowadays widely accepted that there are indeed such counterexamples, though individual cases remain controversial. One such controversial case is the so-called McKinsey paradox. The paradox presents as a simple collision between three claims that many would find attractive.
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    Anthony Brueckner (2008). Wright on the McKinsey Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):385–391.
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