David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:167-245 (2004)
[Crispin Wright] Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. 'Entitlement', as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counter-exemplifies that identification. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently far. Three kinds of entitlement are characterised and given prima facie support, and a fourth is canvassed. Certain foreseeable limitations of the suggested anti-sceptical strategy are noted. The discussion is grounded, overall, in a conception of the sceptical paradoxes not as directly challenging our having any warrant for large classes of our beliefs but as crises of intellectual conscience for one who wants to claim that we do. /// [ Martin Davies] Wright's account of sceptical arguments and his use of the idea of epistemic entitlement are reviewed. His notion of non-transmission of epistemic warrant is explained and a concern about his notion of entitlement is developed. An epistemological framework different from Wright's is described and several notions of entitlement are introduced. One of these, negative entitlement, is selected for more detailed comparison with Wright's notion. Thereafter, the paper shows how the two notions of entitlement have contrasting consequences for non-transmission of warrant and how they go naturally with two conceptions of the presuppositions of epistemic projects. Problems for negative entitlement are explained and solutions are proposed
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Aidan McGlynn (2013). Believing Things Unknown. Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Jessica Brown (2011). Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence. Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.
Annalisa Coliva (2010). Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist? Philosophical Investigations 33 (1):1-23.
Farid Masrour (2011). In Defense of Epistemic Modesty. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):312-331.
Sharon Berry (2013). Default Reasonableness and the Mathoids. Synthese 190 (17):3695-3713.
Similar books and articles
Hamid Vahid (2011). The Concept of Entitlement and its Epistemic Relevance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):380-399.
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2009). Entitlement, Value and Rationality. Synthese 171 (3):443-457.
Albert Casullo (2007). What is Entitlement? Acta Analytica 22 (4):267 - 279.
Chris Tucker (2009). Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.
C. S. Jenkins (2007). Entitlement and Rationality. Synthese 157 (1):25 - 45.
Mikael Janvid (2009). The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement. Acta Analytica 24 (4):263-274.
Jon Altschul, Epistemic Entitlement. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-548.
Martin Smith (2013). Entitlement and Evidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):735-753.
Crispin Wright (2007). The Perils of Dogmatism. In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press
Patrice Philie (2009). Entitlement as a Response to I–Ii–III Scepticism. Synthese 171 (3):459 - 466.
Martin Davies (2004). Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):213–245.
Hamid Vahid (2012). Burge on Perceptual Entitlement. Metaphilosophy 43 (3):187-203.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads141 ( #26,177 of 1,843,614 )
Recent downloads (6 months)17 ( #41,946 of 1,843,614 )
How can I increase my downloads?