On intuitional stability: The clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic

Cognition 115 (3):491-503 (2010)
Abstract
Skepticism about the epistemic value of intuition in theoretical and philosophical inquiry has recently been bolstered by empirical research suggesting that people’s concrete-case intuitions are vulnerable to irrational biases (e.g., the order effect). What is more, skeptics argue that we have no way to ‘‘calibrate” our intuitions against these biases and no way of anticipating intuitional instability. This paper challenges the skeptical position, introducing data from two studies that suggest not only that people’s concrete-case intuitions are often stable, but also that people have introspective awareness of this stability, providing a promising means by which to assess the epistemic value of our intuitions.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2010.02.003
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 20,845
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 43 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Sharmistha Dhar (2009). Determinism: Do Untutored Intuitions Feed the Bugbears? International Journal on Humanistic Ideology 2 (1):167-189.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-07-24

Total downloads

340 ( #5,758 of 1,906,920 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

14 ( #45,735 of 1,906,920 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.