David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 73 (1):19 - 40 (2010)
One reason philosophers have addressed the metaphysics of color is its apparent relevance to the sciences concerned with color phenomena. In the light of such thinking, this paper examines a pairing of views that has received much attention: color physicalism and externalism about the content of perceptual experience. It is argued that the latter is a dubious conception of the workings of our perceptual systems. Together with flawed appeals to the empirical literature, it has led some philosophers to grant color physicalism a scientific legitimacy it does not merit. This discussion provides a useful entry into broader points pertaining to debates about color realism and the relationship between philosophical theories of color and the relevant empirical literatures. A sketch of a novel form of color realism is offered, as is an example that fills in some details of that sketch
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References found in this work BETA
Andrew Botterell (2003). Colors as Explainers? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):785-786.
Eli Brenner & Jeroen B. J. Smeets (2001). We Are Better Off Without Perfect Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):215-216.
R. O. Brown (2003). Background and Illuminants: The Yin and Yang of Colour Constancy. In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press. 247--272.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alistair M. C. Isaac (2014). Structural Realism for Secondary Qualities. Erkenntnis 79 (3):481-510.
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