Personal identity, fission and time travel

Philosophia 34 (2):129-142 (2006)
One problem that has formed the focus of much recent discussion on personal identity is the Fission Problem. The aim of this paper is to offer a novel solution to this problem.
Keywords Personal Identity  Fission  Necessary Identity  Moral responsibility
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-006-9019-7
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Jacob Ross (2014). Divided We Fall. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):222-262.
Heather Demarest (2015). Fission May Kill You. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3).

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