Rule-following without reasons: Wittgenstein's quietism and the constitutive question

Ratio 20 (4):481–502 (2007)
Abstract
This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, "the Rule-following Considerations".[2] So, let me begin by explaining my focus here
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00379.x
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Paul Boghossian (2003). Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.

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Paul Boghossian (2014). What is Inference? Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.

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