Teleological Explanations: An Etiological Analysis of Goals and Functions

University of California Press (1976)
INTRODUCTION The appeal to teleological principles of explanation within the body of natural science has had an unfortunate history. ...
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ISBN(s) 0520030869   9780520030862
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Karen Neander (1991). The Teleological Notion of 'Function'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):454 – 468.
Sara Green, Arnon Levy & William Bechtel (2015). Design Sans Adaptation. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (1):15-29.

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