David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):485-501 (2012)
Skepticism about the epistemic value of intuition in theoretical and philosophical inquiry fueled by the empirical discovery of irrational bias (e.g., the order effect) in people's judgments has recently been challenged by research suggesting that people can introspectively track intuitional instability. The two studies reported here build upon this, the first by demonstrating that people are able to introspectively track instability that was experimentally induced by introducing conflicting expert opinion about certain cases, and the second by demonstrating that it was the presence of instability?not merely the presence of conflicting information?that resulted in changes in the relevant attitudinal states (i.e., confidence and belief strength). The paper closes with the suggestion that perhaps the best explanation for these (and other) findings may be that intuitional instability is not actually ?intuitional.?
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman (2015). Philosophers’ Biased Judgments Persist Despite Training, Expertise and Reflection. Cognition 141:127-137.
Michael Hannon (2015). The Universal Core of Knowledge. Synthese 192 (3):769-786.
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