In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press (2007)
|Abstract||"Dogmatism" is a term renovated by James Pryor  to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to Scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge 1 and Peacocke.2 If the global strategy could succeed, (...) it would pre-empt any role in the diagnosis and treatment of sceptical paradoxes for the kind of notion of entitlement (rational, non-evidential warrant) I have proposed elsewhere [Wright 2004]. But my overarching contention will be that Dogmatism is, generally and locally, too problematic a stance to be helpful in that project.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
G. B. Kerferd (1982). Doubt and Dogmatism M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat and J. Barnes (Edd.) Doubt and Dogmatism, Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Pp. Xii + 342. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. £12.50. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 32 (01):50-52.
Ram Neta (2004). Perceptual Evidence and the New Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):199-214.
Sébastien Charles (1998). Between Dogmatism and Relativism. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (1):38-45.
Brian Weatherson (2007). The Bayesian and the Dogmatist. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.
Matthew Kotzen (2012). Silins's Liberalism. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):61-68.
Adam Leite (2011). Immediate Warrant, Epistemic Responsibility, and Moorean Dogmatism. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Chris Tucker (2010). Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads380 ( #220 of 548,979 )
Recent downloads (6 months)29 ( #1,531 of 548,979 )
How can I increase my downloads?