David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Metaphilosophy 41 (1):95-114 (2010)
Abstract: Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of "knows." When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism (from Keith DeRose) and methodological contextualism (from Michael Williams). I argue that methodological contextualism is superior both in its response to skepticism and in its mechanism for changing contexts. However, methodological contextualism still faces two challenges: explaining why we are solidly committed to some contexts, and explaining why knowledge within a context is valuable. I propose virtue contextualism as a useful extension of methodological contextualism, focusing on the way that our virtues depend on our social roles. My proposed virtue contextualism retains the benefits of methodological contextualism while explaining both our commitment to particular contexts and the value of knowledge held within those contexts.
|Keywords||social roles intellectual virtues Keith DeRose contextualism Michael Williams virtue epistemology virtue contextualism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Julia Annas (2006). Virtue Ethics. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press 515--536.
Julia Annas (2002). VI-My Station and its Duties: Ideals and the Social Embeddedness of Virtue. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):109-123.
Marcus Tullius Cicero, Miriam T. Griffin & E. M. Atkins (1991). On Duties. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Stewart Cohen (1999). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):57-89.
Stewart Cohen (1998). Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):289 – 306.
Citations of this work BETA
Guy Axtell (2010). Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):73-94.
Peter Milne (2012). Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion. Dialectica 66 (3):331-349.
Sarah Wright (2011). Knowledge and Social Roles: A Virtue Approach. Episteme 8 (1):99-111.
Similar books and articles
Ernest Sosa (2004). Relevant Alternatives, Contextualism Included. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):35-65.
Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger (2004). Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):143 - 172.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2007). Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):131-140.
Keith DeRose (1999). Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense. In J. Greco & E. Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell Publishers 187--205.
Martin Montminy (2007). Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction. Synthese 155 (1):99 - 125.
Dirk Koppelberg (2004). On the Prospects for Virtue Contextualism: Comments on Greco. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):401--413.
Jay Newhard (2012). The Argument From Skepticism for Contextualism. Philosophia 40 (3):563-575.
Duncan Pritchard (2008). Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):437–447.
Elke Brendel (2005). Why Contextualists Cannot Know They Are Right: Self-Refuting Implications of Contextualism. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (2):38-55.
Matthias Steup (2005). Contextualism and Conceptual Disambiguation. Acta Analytica 20 (1):3-15.
Added to index2010-01-12
Total downloads58 ( #41,588 of 1,699,564 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #161,079 of 1,699,564 )
How can I increase my downloads?