David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):583-607 (2007)
This paper examines the relevance of philosophical work on consciousness to its scientific study. Of particular concern is the debate over whether consciousness can be naturalized, which is typically taken to have consequences for the prospects for its scientific investigation. It is not at all clear that philosophers of consciousness have properly identified and evaluated the assumptions about scientific activity made by both naturalization and anti- naturalization projects. I argue that there is good reason to think that some of the assumptions about physicalism and explanation made by the parties to the debate are open to serious doubt. Thus this paper is an invitation for those inquiring into whether consciousness can be naturalized to more carefully consider the expected payoff of such efforts
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
James Woodward (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press.
David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson (2001). Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation. Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Pat Lewtas (2014). The Irrationality of Physicalism. Axiomathes 24 (3):313-341.
Dan Zahavi (2004). Phenomenology and the Project of Naturalization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):331-47.
Tim Bayne (2007). Conscious States and Conscious Creatures: Explanation in the Scientific Study of Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):1–22.
David Papineau (2003). Theories of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press 353.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
D. Gamez (2008). Progress in Machine Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):887-910.
Michael V. Antony (2002). Concepts of Consciousness, Kinds of Consciousness, Meanings of 'Consciousness'. Philosophical Studies 109 (1):1-16.
Francisco J. Varela (1999). Present-Time Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):111-140.
Michael Pitman (2003). Consciousness Studies: Research Prospects in the ‘Cradle of Human Consciousness’. Alternation 10 (1):271-291.
Michael V. Antony (2001). Is 'Consciousness' Ambiguous? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):19-44.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). The Difference That Self-Consciousness Makes. In Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons: Metaphysical Research, Volume 1. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag
William Y. Adams (2004). Machine Consciousness: Plausible Idea or Semantic Distortion? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):46-56.
P. Sven Arvidson (2000). Transformations in Consciousness: Continuity, the Self and Marginal Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (3):3-26.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads80 ( #53,242 of 1,907,520 )
Recent downloads (6 months)19 ( #34,287 of 1,907,520 )
How can I increase my downloads?