Godel on computability

Philosophia Mathematica 14 (2):189-207 (2006)
Abstract
The identification of an informal concept of ‘effective calculability’ with a rigorous mathematical notion like ‘recursiveness’ or ‘Turing computability’ is still viewed as problematic, and I think rightly so. I analyze three different and conflicting perspectives Gödel articulated in the three decades from 1934 to 1964. The significant shifts in Gödel's position underline the difficulties of the methodological issues surrounding the Church-Turing Thesis.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,819
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Gualtiero Piccinini (2011). The Physical Church–Turing Thesis: Modest or Bold? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (4):733 - 769.
P. Cassou-Nogues (2009). Gödel's Introduction to Logic in 1939. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (1):69-90.
Similar books and articles
Stewart Shapiro (1983). Remarks on the Development of Computability. History and Philosophy of Logic 4 (1-2):203-220.
Robert I. Soare (1996). Computability and Recursion. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):284-321.
Peter Koepke (2005). Turing Computations on Ordinals. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):377-397.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-08-24

Total downloads

13 ( #125,691 of 1,099,934 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #90,387 of 1,099,934 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.