What are Beall and Restall pluralists about?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):409 – 420 (2004)
In this paper I argue that Beall and Restall's claim that there is one true logic of metaphysical modality is incompatible with the formulation of logical pluralism that they give. I investigate various ways of reconciling their pluralism with this claim, but conclude that none of the options can be made to work.
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DOI 10.1080/713659876
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